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Abstract
Many houses are at risk of being destroyed by wildfires. While previous studies have
improved our understanding of how, when and why houses are destroyed by wildfires, little
attention has been given to how these fires started. We compiled a dataset of wildfires that
destroyed houses in New South Wales and Victoria and, by comparing against wildfires
where no houses were destroyed, investigated the relationship between the distribution of
ignition causes for wildfires that did and did not destroy houses. Powerlines, lightning and
deliberate ignitions are the main causes of wildfires that destroyed houses. Powerlines
were 6 times more common in the wildfires that destroyed houses data than in the wildfires
where no houses were destroyed data and lightning was 2 times more common. For deliber-
ate- and powerline-caused wildfires, temperature, wind speed, and forest fire danger index
were all significantly higher and relative humidity significantly lower (P < 0.05) on the day of
ignition for wildfires that destroyed houses compared with wildfires where no houses were
destroyed. For all powerline-caused wildfires the first house destroyed always occurred on
the day of ignition. In contrast, the first house destroyed was after the day of ignition for 78%
of lightning-caused wildfires. Lightning-caused wildfires that destroyed houses were signifi-
cantly larger (P < 0.001) in area than human-caused wildfires that destroyed houses. Our
results suggest that targeting fire prevention strategies around ignition causes, such as
improving powerline safety and targeted arson reduction programmes, and reducing fire
spread may decrease the number of wildfires that destroy houses.
Introduction
Many people live in areas that place them at risk from the devastating impact of wildfires.
There are numerous examples globally of wildfires that have caused the loss of life and destruc-
tion of many houses e.g. [1–7]. These events typically cause major social disruption and may
result in billions of dollars of damages. For example, the 2009 Black Saturday fires in Victoria
impacted on 78 towns and resulted in 173 lives lost, 2133 houses destroyed and direct eco-
nomic costs conservatively estimated at $4.4 billion [1]. Although relatively few fires cause
major losses of human lives and homes [8], there is potential for the number of destructive
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083 September 6, 2016 1 / 18
a11111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Collins KM, Penman TD, Price OF (2016)
Some Wildfire Ignition Causes Pose More Risk of
Destroying Houses than Others. PLoS ONE 11(9):
e0162083. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083
Editor: Eric Gordon Lamb, University of
Saskatchewan, CANADA
Received: December 14, 2015
Accepted: August 17, 2016
Published: September 6, 2016
Copyright: © 2016 Collins et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: A redacted data set
(excludes fire name, locality and fire start date) has
been uploaded onto figshare. The link to the data is
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3753411.v2.
Funding: The authors received no specific funding
for this work.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
wildfires to increase due to population growth, more homes being built in the wildland urban
interface [9–11] and climate change [12–14].
The probability of a wildfire destroying a house is determined by three elements: the proba-
bility of an ignition occurring, the probability of a fire spreading to where a house is located
and the probability that a house will be destroyed in that fire [15]. If an ignition occurs, fire
suppression may stop a wildfire from spreading and reaching houses although this is depen-
dent on a number of factors such as weather [16–18], fuel type [16], fuel load [17, 19], slope
[17, 19], response time [16, 17], number of resources available [19] and the fire size when
resources commence suppression activities [16–18]. If fire spreads to where houses are located,
the probability of a house being destroyed depends on the level of fire exposure (radiant heat,
flame contact and ember density) [20, 21], the vulnerability (construction, design, material and
siting) of the house [20–22] and suppression actions of fire agencies or residents [20, 23, 24].
Fire weather is the dominant factor that determines the probability of wildfire destroying a
house [25–28]. Fire weather has a major influence on ignition probability [29], fire spread,
ember spotting distance and fire intensity [30, 31] which in turn determines the probability of
fire suppression success [31–33]. Most houses destroyed by wildfires occur during periods of
extreme fire weather [34–36] when opportunities for safe and effective fire suppression actions
are very restricted [17, 37]. Under these weather conditions, the effectiveness of fuel reduction
treatments is also limited [27, 37–39] but house survival is more likely if the treatments are
located in areas adjacent to houses than distant landscape treatments [25, 26, 28, 40–42].
Wildfire ignitions are either due to human, through accidental or deliberate action, or natu-
ral sources. The spatial and temporal pattern of ignitions are associated with complex drivers
that vary with different ignition causes e.g. [29, 43, 44]. Many human-caused ignitions occur
close to roads [29, 44] and populated areas [43, 45, 46] whereas lightning ignitions are more
likely to occur away from the wildland urban interface in low population density areas [29, 47].
Ignition location influences the probability of a wildfire impacting on houses. The closer the
ignition is to houses, the more likely it will spread to a house under any weather conditions
[48]. Under extreme weather conditions, wildfires starting long distances from the wildland
urban interface may reach houses [26, 48].
An understanding of which ignition causes result in destroyed houses can provide a valuable
insight into identifying potential management strategies to reduce the number of wildfires that
destroy houses. As far as we can ascertain, there have been no previous studies comparing the
role of ignition cause on destroyed houses. Previous simulation studies have suggested that an
increase in ignition management effort, simulated by a reduction in ignition probabilities, can
be more effective than fuel management in reducing area burned adjacent to assets [41].
In this study, we investigated the relationship between wildfire ignition causes and destroyed
houses in south-eastern Australia. We compiled a dataset of wildfires that destroyed houses to
determine which ignition causes are more likely to result in destroyed houses and whether there
are associated weather conditions that increase the probability of a destroyed house.
Methods
The study area (Fig 1) was defined by the boundaries of the states of New South Wales and Vic-
toria. These states have the highest number of wildfires that destroyed houses in Australia [34].
Housing density is highest in Sydney and Melbourne, where two thirds of the population in the
study area reside (Fig 1). Other high housing density areas are in coastal areas and a few inland
cities. The major vegetation in the coastal and mountainous hinterland areas are Eucalyptus
species dominated forests and woodlands [49, 50]. These forests can burn at very high intensi-
ties (> 50,000 kW/m) but usually with low frequency (20–100 year) [51]. Similarly the mallee
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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eucalypts in north-western Victoria and south-western New South Wales can burn at high
intensities (10,000–50,000 kW/m) also with low frequency (20–100 year) [51]. Most of the
other areas are either pasture, croplands or shrublands that burn at lower intensities (< 5,000
kW/m) with frequency intervals between 5–100 years. [51].
Long term destroyed house data
A dataset of wildfires that destroyed houses was developed by collating available data on such
wildfires from July 1951 to June 2015 and their ignition cause. Although houses were destroyed
by wildfire in the study area prior to 1951, most notably in 1926, 1939 and 1944 when over 500
houses were destroyed by wildfires each year [52], the available data on these wildfires was not
of sufficient detail to be included. Only wildfires that destroyed a house were included in the
dataset. Wildfires that only damaged houses or destroyed other buildings or property such as
sheds, business premises, caravans and cars were not included in the dataset as information on
these wildfires was not consistently available.
Fig 1. Location of study area and housing density, housing units/km2 in relation to local government areas. Source: generated from data from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011 Census of Population and Housing. Developed using Administrative Boundaries produced by PSMA Australia Limited
licensed by the Commonwealth of Australia under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g001
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A range of information about each wildfire that destroyed a house was captured: fire name
or locality, fire start date, likely date the first house was destroyed, location, number of houses
destroyed, ignition cause, fire size, and fuel type. The location was recorded as the local govern-
ment area where the house was destroyed as this was the finest scale the destroyed house data
could be attributed to with reasonable precision. The fire size was recorded as the total number of
hectares burnt by the wildfire. If multiple wildfires with the same ignition cause merged then this
was recorded as a single wildfire for this cause. If fires with different ignition causes merged, then
the total fire size was allocated on an equal basis for each ignition cause. Where possible, the fuel
type the fire burnt through was recorded to provide an indication of fire behaviour.
A number of different data sources were accessed in order to compile the destroyed houses
dataset. These included fire agency databases, annual reports and media releases, coronial
inquest reports, royal commission reports, post fire review reports, Victorian municipal fire
management plans, journal articles, books and newspaper articles. The details of the sources of
information are provided in S1 Table. There may be additional wildfires where houses were
destroyed within the study period (1951–2015) but there was insufficient information to
include them in the dataset.
12 year comparative data
To enable a comparison of wildfires that destroyed houses and those that did not (i.e. wildfires
where no houses were destroyed), wildfire ignition records were obtained from the Country
Fire Authority and the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning in Victoria
and the New South Wales Rural Fire Service. The ignition cause and date of ignition were used
in the analysis. The Victorian wildfires where no houses were destroyed data included records
for 12 fire years (July to June) between 1997/98 and 2008/09 and were compared against wild-
fires that destroyed houses in Victoria from 1997/98 to 2008/09. The New South Wales wild-
fires where no houses were destroyed data included records for 12 fire years between 2001/02
and 2012/13 and were compared against wildfires that destroyed houses in New South Wales
from 2001/02 to 2012/13. Only wildfires that destroyed houses within the relevant 12 year
period were used in the comparative analysis as the distribution of ignitions is unlikely to be
same across all years of the 64 year destroyed house dataset.
Weather records from the nearest available Bureau of Meteorology station were sourced for
the 12 year comparative analysis for both wildfires that did and did not destroy houses. For the
day of ignition we extracted the 1500h temperature, relative humidity (RH), wind speed and
calculated the forest fire danger index (FFDI). The FFDI is related to the chance of a fire ignit-
ing, its rate of spread and difficulty of suppression [53] and has been used to examine the risk
of wildfires destroying houses [15, 34]. For most of the wildfires, the time of ignition was not
known, so the 1500h weather was chosen as this is usually when the maximum FFDI is likely to
occur [54].
Ignitions with known causes were grouped into four causal categories: deliberate, lightning,
powerlines and other known (Table 1). Arson and suspicious causes were combined because
wildfires that destroy houses usually undergo a detailed causal investigation that may result in
more ignitions designated as arson than suspicious. The other known category could not be
split any further due to the low numbers of wildfires that destroyed houses for the separate
causes within the 12 year comparative period.
Analysis
Long term destroyed house data. Fire sizes of lightning-caused wildfires that destroyed
houses were compared to human-caused wildfires that destroyed houses using Welch’s anova.
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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This test was chosen as the results of Bartlett’s test revealed that the data were heteroscedastic.
Prior to analysis, the fire size data were checked for normality using histograms and, as the
data were highly skewed, it was transformed using natural logarithms.
12 year comparative data. The 12 year data of wildfires that destroyed houses and wild-
fires where no houses were destroyed were compared graphically by ignition cause (all causes
included undetermined ignitions; deliberate, lightning, powerlines and other known) and fire
weather element on the day of ignition (FFDI, temperature, wind speed and RH). The cumula-
tive % distribution for wildfires that did and did not destroy houses in the 12 year period for
each ignition cause and fire weather element was calculated. Welch’s anova was used to deter-
mine if there was a statistically significant difference between the wildfires that destroyed
houses and wildfires where no houses were destroyed for each ignition cause and fire weather
element. Each of the 4 known ignition causes were tested separately for each fire weather ele-
ment. For example, temperature on day of ignition for powerline-caused wildfires that
destroyed houses were compared to the temperature on day of ignition for the powerline-
caused wildfires where no houses were destroyed. Prior to analysis, each set of data were
checked for normality using histograms and a natural logarithmic transformation was applied
to the FFDI data. As Bartlett tests showed that for some data the variances were not equal,
Welch’s anova was chosen to compare the data. The Fisher’s exact test of independence was
used to examine whether the proportion of each of the known ignition cause categories are dif-
ferent when compared between the wildfires that destroyed houses and wildfires where no
houses were destroyed for the 12 year period. The tests were conducted using R statistical pack-
age v3.1.0 [55].
Results
Long term destroyed house data
From July 1951 to June 2015 there were 250 wildfires that destroyed houses, 155 where the
ignition cause was identified and 95 where the cause was undetermined (Table 2). There were
7430 houses destroyed by wildfires in the 64 year study period (Table 2), with over 85% of
these houses destroyed in forest fires. A third of the houses destroyed were the result of wild-
fires started by powerlines, 25% from fires with an undetermined cause, 22% from deliberately
ignited fires and 11% from fires started by lightning strikes. The main ignition causes in the
other known category were equipment / machinery use (14 wildfires, 250 houses destroyed),
escapes from fuel reduction burning and agricultural burning activities (13 wildfires, 279
houses destroyed) and wildfires accidently ignited by a cigarette or other smoking material (5
wildfires, 33 houses destroyed).
Table 1. Description of cause categories used for wildfire ignitions in the 12 year period.
Cause Examples of fire causes within category
Deliberate Fires where there is evidence of deliberately ignited fires, including fires ignited by juveniles
and fires ignited without a fire permit i.e. illegal fires Suspicious fires where circumstances
indicate that the fire was likely to be deliberately ignited but ignition source may not be
identified
Lightning Fires that result from a lightning strike
Powerlines Fires caused by powerlines clashing, arcing or a branch or animal contacting live parts of the
network or breakage of wires, poles, cross-arms, insulators or other components
Other
known
Fires caused by equipment or machinery use or malfunction. Accidental escapes from
prescribed burns, agricultural burns, debris burning, campfires or cooking fires. Fires
accidently ignited by a cigarette or other smoking material. Fires accidently caused by
ordnance training activities. Fires identified as accidental but no further details available
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.t001
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083 September 6, 2016 5 / 18
The Blue Mountains local government area, located approximately 50 km west of Sydney,
had the highest number of wildfires that destroyed houses for a local government area with 15
wildfires (Fig 2). The Surf Coast local government area, located approximately 120 km south-
west of Melbourne, had the highest number of houses destroyed for a local government area
with 733 (Fig 3); almost all (730) were destroyed in a wildfire in 1983. Wildfires that destroy a
very large number of houses in a single event are infrequent, only 6 wildfires destroyed> 200
houses. These 6 wildfires account for 48% of the total number of houses destroyed by wildfire.
Over 60% of wildfires had< 10 houses destroyed in the event.
The area burnt by a wildfire that destroyed houses ranged from 2 ha to 1.15 million ha
(Table 3). Lightning-caused wildfires that destroyed houses were significantly larger
(P< 0.001) in area than human-caused wildfires: median value for lightning-caused ignitions
was 26314 ha compared with 3222 ha for human-caused wildfires that destroyed houses.
The first house destroyed most often occurred on the day the wildfire started (Table 4). For
wildfires started by powerlines, the first house destroyed always occurred on the day the fire
started. In contrast, only 6 of 27 lightning-caused wildfires incurred a house destroyed on the
day of ignition. For 10 wildfires (5 lightning-caused), it was at least 2 weeks after the fire ini-
tially started until the first house was destroyed.
12 year comparative data
For deliberate- and powerline-caused wildfires, temperature, wind speed, and FFDI were all
significantly higher and RH significantly lower (P< 0.05) on the day of ignition for wildfires
that destroyed houses compared with wildfires where no houses were destroyed in the same 12
year period (Fig 4). Lightning-caused ignitions had significantly higher wind speed (P< 0.05)
for wildfires that destroyed houses but FFDI (P = 0.07), RH (P = 0.40) and temperature
(P = 0.71) were not significantly different from wildfires where no houses were destroyed in the
12 year period. However, the first house was destroyed on the day of ignition for only 3 of the
18 lightning-caused wildfires in the 12 year period. The other known-caused ignitions had sig-
nificantly lower RH (P = 0.05) for wildfires that destroyed houses but FFDI (P = 0.10), temper-
ature (P = 0.10) and wind speed (P = 0.20) were not significantly different from wildfires where
no houses were destroyed in the 12 year period. Most deliberate-caused wildfires that destroyed
houses started when the temperature> 30°C, wind speed> 20 km/hr, RH< 25% and
FFDI> 25 (Fig 5). Most powerline-caused wildfires that destroyed houses occurred when the
temperature> 25°C, wind speed> 30 km/hr, RH< 25% and FFDI> 30 (Fig 5).
Wildfires that destroy houses are rare events with only 0.06% of wildfires resulting in a
house destroyed in the 12 year comparative period. For the 12 year period, there was a signifi-
cant difference in the proportion of known ignition causes for wildfires that destroyed houses
(P< 0.001) when compared with wildfires where no houses were destroyed. Powerlines were 6
times more common in the wildfires that destroyed houses data than in the wildfires where no
Table 2. The number of wildfires that destroyed houses and the number of houses destroyed from
1951 to 2015 by ignition cause.
Ignition cause No. of wildfires that destroyed houses No. of houses destroyed
Deliberate 61 1663
Powerlines 30 2513
Lightning 29 843
Other known 35 580
Undetermined 95 1831
Total 250 7430
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.t002
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houses were destroyed data and lightning 2 times more common (Fig 6). The proportion of
deliberate ignitions was slightly higher for wildfires that destroyed houses and other known
ignitions were 3 times lower in the wildfires that destroyed houses data than the wildfires
where no houses were destroyed data.
Discussion
We found that powerlines, lightning strikes and deliberate ignitions are the main ignition
causes of wildfires that destroyed houses (Table 2). Arson and powerlines are also among the
main ignition causes of wildfires that destroyed houses in California [56]. For deliberate- and
powerline-caused wildfires, the fire weather was significantly worse on the day of ignition for
wildfires that destroyed houses compared with wildfires where houses were not destroyed (Fig
Fig 2. The number of wildfires that destroyed houses from 1951 to 2015 by local government area.Developed using Administrative
Boundaries produced by PSMA Australia Limited licensed by the Commonwealth of Australia under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International licence (CC BY 4.0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g002
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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Fig 3. The number of houses destroyed by wildfires from 1951 to 2015 by local government area. Developed using Administrative
Boundaries produced by PSMA Australia Limited licensed by the Commonwealth of Australia under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International licence (CC BY 4.0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g003
Table 3. The number of wildfires that destroyed houses from 1951 to 2015 classified by ignition cause and fire size (ha).
Ignition cause No. of wildfires that destroyed houses by fire size (ha)
< 100 100–999 1000–4999 5000–9999 10000–49999 50000–100000 > 100000 Unknown
Deliberate 4 12 18 10 9 5 1 2
Powerlines 2 6 8 1 12 1
Lightning 2 2 6 7 4 8
Other known 6 6 6 3 7 3 3 1
Undetermined 5 8 9 8 20 3 4 38
Total 17 34 43 28 55 16 16 41
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.t003
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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Table 4. The number of wildfires that destroyed houses from 1951 to 2015 classified by ignition cause and the number of days from fire ignition
until the first house was destroyed.
Ignition cause No. of days from fire ignition until first house destroyed
0 1 2 3 5 > 5 unknown
Deliberate 50 4 1 4 2
Powerlines 30
Lightning 6 5 2 3 3 8 2
Other known 21 3 5 3 3
Undetermined 36 2 3 1 1 2 50
Total 143 14 11 4 4 17 57
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.t004
Fig 4. Box plots for ignition causes of wildfires that destroyed houses and wildfires where no houses were destroyed for the 12 years with
complementary data for fire weather elements. Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI), hd = wildfires that destroyed houses, nhd = wildfires where no
houses were destroyed, All = all ignition causes including undetermined ignitions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g004
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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5). For deliberate ignitions, the first house destroyed most often occurred on the day of ignition
whereas for powerline-caused wildfires the first house destroyed always occurred on the day of
ignition (Table 4), this has not been previously reported in other studies. Our results are consis-
tent with previous research that showed that weather and the proximity of ignition to houses
are important factors in determining the probability of houses destroyed by wildfires [37, 48].
However, for lightning-caused wildfires proximity of ignition to houses may be less important
as the first house destroyed from a lightning-caused wildfire most often occurred at least two
days after the fire started (Table 4). For these events, weather on subsequent days after ignition
is likely to be important, although houses destroyed from grass fires started by lightning strikes
usually occurred within a day of the fire starting.
Fig 5. Cumulative % distribution of wildfires that destroyed houses and wildfires where no houses were destroyed by ignition cause for the 12
years with complementary data for fire weather elements. Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI), dotted line = wildfires that destroyed houses, solid
lines = wildfires where no houses were destroyed, All = all ignition causes including undetermined ignitions
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g005
Wildfire Ignition Causes and Destroyed Houses
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The proportion of deliberately ignited wildfires that destroyed houses is similar to the pro-
portion of deliberately ignited wildfires where no houses were destroyed but powerline- and
lightning-caused fires are disproportionately higher for wildfires that destroyed houses (Fig 6).
While there are no similar studies investigating ignition causes and destroyed houses, the pro-
portion of powerline-caused wildfires substantially increases in Southern California under high
wind conditions and several large destructive wildfires in October 2007 were ignited by power-
lines [57]. These results suggest that to decrease the number of wildfires that destroy houses,
efforts should be focussed on improving the safety of powerlines, reducing the fire spread of
lightning-caused wildfires and reducing the number of deliberate wildfire ignitions.
Powerline-caused ignitions were the most over-represented cause in the wildfires that
destroyed houses data and resulted in the most houses destroyed. It has long been recognised
that powerlines are a potential source of destructive wildfires and require actions to reduce the
risk of ignitions. Inquiries following destructive wildfires in Victoria, recommended improving
inspection and maintenance of powerlines and the surrounding vegetation [1, 58], improving
safety equipment on networks, for example fitting spreaders to stop conductors from clashing
[1, 58], installing devices that automatically switch off power when a fault occurs and changing
settings on high fire risk days to reduce energy release if a fault occurs [1] and burying cables
underground in high risk areas [1, 58, 59]. Following the Black Saturday fires, the Victorian
government allocated $750 million to reduce the risk of powerlines causing wildfires, including
$200 million to replace network and private powerlines in the highest risk wildfire areas and
$500 million to electricity network operators to install new technologies that will better control
the faults that may cause fires [60]. Additionally, regulations have been strengthened with
major network operators required to prepare a bushfire mitigation plan that details how the
network operator will minimise the risk of fire ignition from its supply network and report
Fig 6. The proportion of wildfires that destroyed houses (n = 58) and wildfires where no houses were destroyed (n = 87055) by known cause
for the 12 years with complementary data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162083.g006
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annually of its performance to an independent regulator. The plans are independently audited
and the regulator can direct network operators to implement or modify their plans. If private
powerlines are not maintained, then there are provisions to enable network operators to enter
the land and undertake the work. For example, in Victoria, the Electricity Safety Act 1998 and
Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations 2013 detail the plan requirements and
schedules for inspecting, testing, maintaining and upgrading network assets. The Electricity
Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations 2015mandates the minimum vegetation clearance
distances for overhead powerlines in Victoria and requires network operators to submit an
annual plan for vegetation clearance for approval. Similarly, Californian regulations were
strengthened after destructive wildfires caused by powerlines in Southern California in 2007
[61, 62].
Destroyed houses from powerline-caused wildfires may be largely prevented if the power is
temporarily shut off on high fire risk days. There are legislative arrangements that provide for
this but they are considered a last resort option as the potential impact on the community may
outweigh the risk of leaving the power in service [58, 61, 63]. Temporarily shutting off the
power on high fire risk days will also impact on communication networks important for issuing
fire warnings to the community, may disrupt water supply and adversely affect the welfare of
vulnerable community members. Alternatively, burying cables underground will also eliminate
the fire risk but this is expensive e.g. $40 billion for rural areas in Victoria [63]. To date, other
measures have been preferred, but it is not yet known whether investing in new technologies,
upgrading networks and adopting stricter standards on the design, inspection and maintenance
of networks will substantially reduce the potential for powerline-caused destructive wildfires.
However, if powerlines are found to be the ignition source of a destructive wildfire, then it is
highly likely that network operators will face substantial claims for damages and compensation.
Litigation following the Black Saturday fires has seen electricity network operators required to
pay over $700 million in damages to people who suffered losses in the fires [64–67].
Lightning-caused wildfires that destroyed houses were found to be significantly larger in
size than human-caused wildfires that destroyed houses. This result can be explained by the
spatial patterns of ignitions as lightning ignitions typically occur further away from houses
than human caused ignitions [29, 47, 68] and take longer to reach houses. Their remoteness
from populated places may limit fire suppression efforts due to lengthy response times for
resources to reach the wildfire. Prevention of lightning is of course impossible but fuel reduc-
tion treatments may reduce fires spreading from lightning strikes [37, 69] and improve the
probability of successful fire control [17]. These treatments are most effective if a wildfire
encounters them within 5 years of treatment [70, 71] but under adverse fire weather conditions
the fire intensity may still be too high for safe and effective fire suppression [27] and most
houses are destroyed when the FFDI> 50 [34]. Landscape fuel reduction treatments where
lightning occurs may be ineffective in limiting the fire spread toward the interface as the level
of treatment required to substantially alter the risk of wildfires destroying houses is very large
[40].
Deliberate ignitions typically occur in easily accessible areas, close to urban centres [29, 44,
72]. Unlike other ignition causes, the arsonist chooses the timing and location. When these
ignitions result in destructive consequences pressure is often placed on governments, land
managers, fire and law enforcement agencies to reduce arson ignitions [73]. In response, severe
penalty provisions for arson offences have been enacted in Australian, United States and Medi-
terranean jurisdictions although there is no clear evidence to suggest that this deters arsonists
[73, 74]. However, the fear of being caught may deter arsonists [75] and a recent study has
shown increasing the number of law enforcement officers led to a decrease in deliberately
ignited fires [76]. Preventing deliberate ignitions is difficult as there will always be some people
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who choose to light wildfires [73] and arsonists are rarely caught [74, 77]. There is limited
knowledge on why and how often people light fires [78]; what is known is based on those who
have been caught and may not be representative of the those who avoid apprehension [73, 78].
As a consequence, reducing deliberate wildfire ignitions is likely to be more successful if strate-
gies are concentrated on where fires are ignited (arson hot-spots) rather than the profile of an
arsonist [77]. Potential prevention strategies for arson hots spots include: community educa-
tion and arson awareness programmes; reducing fuels in the area; limiting access and increas-
ing patrols of these areas on days of very high fire danger [77]. It is difficult to evaluate how
effective these strategies are as changes in the number of ignitions need to be considered in the
context of variations in fire weather and fuel availability over time. However, a Western Aus-
tralia study has correlated the reduction in the number of deliberate ignitions [79] to a targeted
arson reduction programme in the area [80].
Many of the other known ignitions occur due to the careless use of fire or equipment/
machinery. Laws have been enacted to reduce these types of ignitions, by restricting when and
how activities that may cause wildfires are conducted. For example, machinery such as tractors
and harvesters must be fitted with a spark arrester and carry fire suppression equipment. Per-
mits are required to light a fire, except for a cooking fire, in the open during the fire danger
period. The fire danger period is typically declared for several months at the onset of warmer
weather and when the vegetation becomes drier. A total fire ban may be declared (usually for a
24 h period) when predicted fire behaviour indicates wildfires are likely to spread rapidly and
be difficult to control (typically when the FFDI> 50). A total fire ban prohibits the lighting of
fires in the open and the use of hot works equipment, such as welding or grinding. These laws
will only be effective if people know and understand them. Investigations following an equip-
ment-caused wildfire that destroyed houses in Western Australia found 33% of people inter-
viewed were not aware that a total fire ban had been declared [81] and there was a lack of
understanding of what activities were prohibited [82].
Our study was limited because 38% of wildfires that destroyed houses the ignition cause was
undetermined. In recent years, improvements in fire agency record keeping, the availability of
fire investigation specialists and technology such as lightning strike detection systems, has
resulted in increased reliability and quality of data on ignition causes.
Improving powerline safety and targeted arson reduction programmes may reduce some
wildfire ignitions but there is still potential for houses to be destroyed by wildfires, particularly
during extreme weather conditions. Fuel management and suppression resources may reduce
fire spread but these are most effective under more benign weather conditions [27, 37]. Con-
tainment success is more likely when suppression resources reach the fire when it is small in
size [16, 17, 83]. The early detection of ignitions and the placement of resources in strategic
locations to minimise response time [84] may improve suppression effectiveness. Other mea-
sures are centred around increasing the resilience of houses to wildfire impacts, e.g. reducing
the exposure of houses to wildfire attack by development planning and building controls, and
educating residents on preparing their property for wildfire. Land use and zoning measures
can be used to prevent housing developments from occurring in wildfire prone areas or require
houses to comply with building construction standards and fire protection measures [9, 85,
86]. Designing or retrofitting houses to prevent ember penetration will improve the chance of a
house’s survival in a wildfire as embers are the predominant mechanism of house ignitions
from wildfires [21, 86, 87]. Reducing potential radiant heat and flame exposure can be achieved
by siting the house relative to flammable vegetation and building construction standards [21,
86, 87]. House survival from a wildfire is more likely if the vegetation in a 40m zone surround-
ing a house is well maintained and there are no combustible objects within this zone [21, 28,
87]. Active defence of the house will also increase its chance of survival [20, 24, 87] although
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residents must be well prepared both physically and mentally if they are to undertake fire sup-
pression activities [88].
Our study has highlighted the major wildfire ignition causes that result in destroyed houses,
however focussing on this area only, will not reap the greatest reduction in houses destroyed by
wildfires. A combination of fire management, planning and resident actions is required to
reduce the number of houses destroyed by wildfires.
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